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STATE CHOICE OF LAW IN MASS TORT




In an article entitled The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass
Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 1 we voiced our objections to pro-
posed legislation which would empower federal courts to consolidate the
litigation of "mass torts" in a single federal court and require that court to
apply the substantive law of a "single designated jurisdiction." The pro-
posed legislation toward which our objections were directed included the
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989,2 which was sponsored by
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin.3 On the pages of this
law review, Mr. Kastenmeier and Charles Gardner Geyh, Counsel of the
House Judiciary "Subcommittee on Courts," responded to our article.'
Anyone possessing even passing familiarity with the subject of judicial
administration knows that Congressman Kastenmeier has brought to the
House Judiciary Committee the rare combination of extraordinary intelli-
gence and personal dedication to the improvement of the American judicial
system. When we undertook an analysis of H.R. 3406, we did so because
we believed, notwithstanding the best intentions of the bill's authors, that
such legislation would do more harm than good. The Kastenmeier and
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., University of Pittsburgh, 1956; J.D., Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, 1959.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B., Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute,
1960; J.D., Marquette University, 1965; B.S., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1970.
1. Sedler & Twerski, The Case AgainstAll Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sac-
ifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. Rav. 76 (1989).
2. H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 3,275-76 (1989).
3. Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Wisconsin, was first elected to
the U.S. House of Representatives in 1958 and held the 2d Congressional District seat until 1990.
The Kastenmeier bill, Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 3406, was not included
in the bill that passed the Senate in the closing days of the 101st Congress. The Kastenmeier bill
passed the House and was on the Senate consent calendar but was later dropped due to Senator
Howell T. Heflin's (D-Ala.) objections. Senator Heflin objected because he had not held a hearing
to consider the bill's consolidation procedure for cases arising from single event mass disasters.
Congressman Kastenmeier was expected to reintroduce his bill in the 102d Congress and Senator
Heflin has agreed to hold a hearing on the bill. Exactly what impact Kastenmeier's failure to be
reelected will have on this bill is unknown.
4. Kastenmeier & Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating the Consolidation of
Mass-Accident Litigation: A View from the Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. Rav. 535 (1989).
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Geyh response is, as one would expect, very good. We are delighted that
they have joined issue with us. It is a tribute to the American political
process that the authors took the time and care to draft such a thoughtful
and insightful response to appear in an academic forum. Nonetheless, the
clarity of their response has revealed issues that convince us that we were
quite right in our original opposition to the bill - more right than we first
imagined.
I. OUR CORE CONCERN: THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CHOICE OF
LAW IN "MAss TORT" CAsES
Congressman Kastenmeier and Mr. Geyh note that their work is "both
something less and something more" than a reply.5 As they state, it is
"something less" in the sense that they are trying to respond "to the core,
policy-level concerns that underlie the more specific objections [we] raise,"
and it is "something more" in the sense that they "do not confine [them-
selves] to rebutting criticisms that have been directed at the bill, but take
the opportunity to offer a legislative perspective on efforts to consolidate
duplicative litigation, with a focus on H.R. 3406. ,6
In the same spirit, our reply will be something less in that we will focus
only on our strongest objection to H.R. 3406: that it would require the
displacement of state choice of law in mass tort cases by a federally-imposed
"law of a designated single jurisdiction" rule. We submit that, totally apart
from whether consolidation of mass tort cases is necessary or desirable, if
consolidation ever does occur it should be accomplished without displace-
ment of state choice of law. Where the mass tort cases have been consoli-
dated, the federal court should be required to follow state choice of law and
reach the same choice of law result that would be reached by the court of
the state from which the case was transferred.7
This approach to the applicability of state choice of law in transferred
mass tort cases is the same as is now followed in diversity cases when there
is a venue transfer from one federal court to another.' The transferee court
must apply the law that would have been applied by the court of origination
5. Id. at 537.
6. Id.
7. Under H.R. 3406, mass tort cases could be brought in or transferred to the federal courts
on the basis of minimal diversity and consolidated for hearing and trial before a single federal
court. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 1, at 79-81.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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regardless of whether the transfer of venue was initiated by the defendant 9
or by the plaintiff.10
Our objections to the displacement of state choice of law by a federally
imposed "law of a designated single jurisdiction" rule are fully set out in the
original article and will only be summarized here. First, the requirement
that the "law of a single designated jurisdiction" governs all claims arising
out of the same mass tort would improperly intrude on state sovereignty.
Such an intrusion would deny states the power to determine what substan-
tive law applies to the resolution of these cases, and in many instances
would require the sacrifice of valid state interests.11 Second, in practice,
because of constitutional constraints on what state's law can be selected to
apply in a conflicts case, a federally imposed "law of a designated single
jurisdiction" rule for mass torts would run counter to progressive trends in
choice of law and would impose a choice of law straightjacket in mass tort
cases. In the vast majority of cases, the court would be forced to choose
either the totally discredited "law of the place of the wrong" rule of the
First Restatement,12 or an equally rigid rule of "law of the place of con-
duct." In some cases, the court will simply run out of law, in that there will
be no single designated jurisdiction whose law could constitutionally be ap-
plied to govern all the claims in the particular mass tort case. 3
Congressman Kastenmeier and Mr. Geyh expended a great deal of ef-
fort on demonstrating a need for consolidation of mass tort cases. To the
extent that they set out to respond to our core policy level concerns for the
displacement of state choice of law in mass tort cases, they say that these
concerns are overstated and that such displacement would not "constitute
an unjustifiable intrusion upon state sovereignty, or [be] likely to yield unto-
ward results."' 4 But they devote surprisingly little discussion to these is-
sues and do not respond directly to our core policy concerns. Rather, their
approach tries to demonstrate the necessity for consolidation and to justify
the displacement of state choice of law as an appropriate cost to achieve the
benefits of consolidation.
In contending that displacement of state law would not constitute an
unjustifiable intrusion on state sovereignty, they do little more than boot-
strap the appropriate cost rationale. They recognize that under Erie Rail-
9. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
10. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1284 (1990).
11. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 1, at 86-98.
12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 377 (1934).
13. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 1, at 98-107.
14. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 538.
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road Co. v. Tompkins15 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manfacturing
Co. 16 a federal court hearing a diversity case must apply the substantive law
of the state in which it sits, including that state's conflicts law. But they
then say, "[tihat rule, however, is extremely hard to defend for actions
within the scope of the bill, in which a federal court would not be acting as
a surrogate state court, but rather serving a nationwide function that often
could not have been served by any state court," so that in such a circum-
stance, it "made no sense to have a federal court bound by the conflicts laws
of a single state."17
What this argument fails to consider is that the bill's basis for federal
jurisdiction in mass tort cases is still diversity of citizenship, and that re-
gardless of any nationwide function that is being served by federal court
consolidation in mass tort cases, the federal court is still applying state law.
In another part of the article, the authors strongly make this point, saying
that the bill "respects the traditional role of state law in resolving issues of
liability and damages in tort cases, and encroaches upon the states only to
the extent it must to permit the desired consolidation."' 8 Since the basis of
federal jurisdiction in mass tort cases is still diversity and since state sub-
stantive law is being applied, the federal court, even if serving a nationwide
function, is still a surrogate state court for Erie purposes.
II. IDENTIFYING THE STAKES: VITAL STATE INTERESTS AND STATE-
FEDERAL UNIFORMITY OF RESULT
There can be little question that a major underlying premise of H.R.
3406 is that the efficiencies sought to be effected by the bill can only be
accomplished by enacting a single choice of law rule to govern the claims of
all the litigants in a mass tort case. Kastenmeier and Geyh do not argue
otherwise.19 They indicate that if courts will be required to fragment the
litigation to account for differing state laws, there is little to be gained by
enacting the proposed legislation. The statutory "out," which permits a
court to apply the laws of differing states to various issues or parties, is
clearly to be used only in the rarest of circumstances.20 Nor does there
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
17. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 555.
18. Id. at 563.
19. Id. at 555.
20. In their reply, the authors fall back on the possibility of the court's departing from the
"designated single jurisdiction" rule and looking to additional sources of law in order to avoid
"monstrously wrong" choice of law determinations. Id. at 566. This possibility, of course, under-
cuts all the justifications that have been advanced for the "single designated jurisdiction" rule in
[Vol. 73:625
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seem to be much argument that the choice of law examples, which we set
forth in the original article, would play out in the way explained. Signifi-
cant state interests would have to be sacrificed. What may not be fully
appreciated is just how many issues are subject to interstate conflict and
how serious the intrusions will be.
A decade ago it appeared that the choice of law in tort. cases would be a
matter of rarefied academic interest. Tort law appeared to be taking on a
national character. Differences between one state law and another were
vanishing or being reduced to matters of inconsequential significance.2
The onset of the insurance crisis in the early eighties and the product liabil-
ity crisis in the late eighties spawned a legislative reform movement of un-
precedented scope. Over forty state legislatures have enacted some form of
tort reform legislation and further legislative initiatives are pending in a
host of states.22 The differences from one state to another are not mere
matters of detail, but affect basic issues of duty, standard of care, causation,
affirmative defenses, and recoverable damages. Today, when a state argues
that it wishes its tort law to apply in a choice of law setting, it expresses a
high order policy decision. No one need go searching under rocks to dis-
the first place. As we pointed out in the original article, either "[d]ifferent law will apply to
different parties and different issues" or "[i]n order to avoid fractionalization, a court will be
compelled to opt for the law of a single jurisdiction." Sedler & Twerski, supra note 1, at 105.
21. Issues that dominated choice-of-law cases in the era in which the interest analysis revolu-
tion took place have simply faded from the scene. Host-guest immunities, which provided much
of the early action, have for the most part disappeared from the American landscape. See Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); see also W. PROSSER
& W. KETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1985). Similarly, interspousal
immunity, which was the topic of considerable choice of law litigation, is now the law in only a
small minority ofjurisdictions. See, eg., Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,
95 N.W.2d 814 (1957); EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 848-49 (1990). Wrongful
death limitations provided the substance for many important choice-of-law cases. See, ag.,
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). Court opinions have also gone into oblivion.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra § 127.
22. A compilation of state tort reform statutes that affect product liability claims can be
found in the CCH Products Liability Reporter. See also KEETON, OWEN, MONTGOMERY &
GREEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, ch. 11 (2d ed. 1989). Many law review symposia
have dealt with the general subject of state statutory tort law reform. See Twerski, The Baby
Swallowed the Bathwater, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. Rrv. 1161 (1989); Wright, Allocating Liability
Among Multiple Responsible Causes A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual
Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. Rav. 1141 (1988); Symposium on Developments in
Tort Law and Tort Law Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 669 (1987); Symposium. Issues in Tort
Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987); Symposium on Tort Reform, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 345
(1987); Symposium, Tort and Reform: Will It Advance Justice in the Civil System? 32 VILL. L.
Rav. 1211 (1987); Tort Reform Symposium, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 795 (1987). For a recent
state court decision detailing the striking difference of opinion between state courts on market
share liability, see Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
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cover what state interests are at stake. They are written in large bold type
in ink that has hardly dried on the pages of state statute books.
We do not mean to intimate that all mass tort cases will be loaded down
with dozens of choice of law issues. The real world does not reflect law
school examination hypotheticals. But of this we are certain: when the
conflicts cases arise, they will be significant and will seriously affect the
rights of the parties involved.
In the context of displacement of state choice of law in mass tort cases,
the importance of protecting legitimate state interests interacts with the uni-
formity of result objective of Erie and Klaxon. The uniformity of result
objective is itself sufficient to preclude displacement of state choice of law in
such cases. The harm to basic principles of federalism that would be
brought about by the abandonment of this objective is even more severe
when displacement of state choice of law also brings about the sacrifice of
vital state interests. 23
Let us now turn to the uniformity of result objective. The underlying
premise of Erie and Klaxon is uniformity of result between federal and state
courts in diversity cases. As the Supreme Court has stated:
In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that in all
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litiga-
tion in the federal court should be substantially the same so far as
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if
tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result.24
Because choice of law is obviously outcome-determinative, Klaxon requires
that a federal court apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.
Likewise, in order to implement the policy of uniformity of result between
state and federal courts in diversity litigation when there is a transfer of
venue from one federal court to another, the transferee court must apply
the law that would have been applied by the transferring court had the case
remained there.
23. For early scholarly recognition that Klaxon gives voice to significant state interests and is
logically mandated if interest analysis is the governing conflicts methodology, see Currie, Change
of Venue and the Conflict of Law: A Retraction, 27 U. Cui. L. REv. 341 (1960), and Cavers,
Change in Choice-of-law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, ALI Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 154, 161 (Tent. Draft No.1 1963).
24. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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The Supreme Court recently had occasion to reaffirm the latter principle
in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,2 where it held that the principle was applicable
even when it was the plaintiff who initiated the transfer. The Court empha-
sized that the convenience objectives advanced by a transfer of venue
should not "deprive parties of state law advantages that exist absent diver-
sity jurisdiction," and that such transfer "does not change the law applica-
ble to a diversity case."26 Nor should it matter that it was the plaintiff who
initiated the transfer, since the defendant does not lose any advantage
thereby; the same law applies as would apply if the plaintiff had not initi-
ated the transfer. 7 Finally, the Court noted that a contrary result would
"undermine the Erie rule in a serious way" because it would have the effect
of "chang[ing] the state law applicable to a diversity case. "28
As we pointed out in the original article, this is exactly what happens
under the "single designated jurisdiction" approach to choice of law. In a
mass tort case, a party that wants a different choice of law result than
would be obtained under the conflicts law of the state where the suit was
brought may "change the state law applicable to a diversity case" by mov-
ing to transfer the case to a federal court under H.R. 3406.29
This change of law is illustrated by the airplane crash case we discussed
in the original article. 30 There, California passengers boarded the plane in
California, Michigan passengers boarded it in Michigan, and it crashed on
take-off from the Detroit airport killing all aboard. The plane was designed
and manufactured in New York, and the allegation is that the crash was
due to a defect in the landing gear. California law favors plaintiffs, while
Michigan and New York law favors manufacturers. Under a single desig-
nated jurisdiction rule, California law could not constitutionally be applied
to determine the claims of the survivors of the Michigan residents. Thus,
the only law of a designated single jurisdiction that could be applied would
be the law of Michigan or New York, both of which favor manufacturers.31
If the survivors of the California residents sue in California, California will
25. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
26. Id. at 1280.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1281.
29. It is completely disingenuous to suggest, as Kastenmeier and Geyh do, that "[p]arties
wishing to litigate their accident cases in duplicative state actions may do so," and that all the bill
does is offer the parties "the alternative of a consolidated federal forum that becomes available
only if one or more parties chooses to use it." Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 562. Under
the bill, removal of the case to the federal court is not "consensual." The defendant has the power
to remove the case to federal court and thereby to change the law applicable to a diversity case.




undoubtedly apply its plaintiff-favoring rule. To avoid this result, under
H.R. 3406, the manufacturer may have the case transferred to a federal
court, which is compelled to apply the New York or Michigan manufac-
turer-favoring rule.
What Erie and Klaxon were designed to prevent, therefore, would come
to pass. There would be a "change of state law in a diversity case" because
the manufacturer would be able to remove the case to a federal court that is
"not bound by the choice of law rules of any state." Furthermore, as the
above example indicates, such a result prevents California from implement-
ing the plaintiff-favoring policy reflected in its law in a case where it has a
very strong interest in doing so. To say the least, such a result sacrifices
vital state interests on the altar of efficiency and strongly intrudes upon
state sovereignty in an area traditionally reserved to the states in our consti-
tutional system. For this reason, it can hardly be called an "appropriate
cost" of consolidation.
III. THE SPURIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS
The authors next advance a series of justifications for the "law of a sin-
gle designated jurisdiction" rule.32 These justifications, originally set forth
by the Department of Justice, are that the "law of a single designated juris-
diction" rule is necessary to avoid the purported evils of (1) "choice of law
litigation of staggering complexity," (2) "delay in settlements resulting from
uncertainty in the choice of law to be applied," (3) "impetus toward forum
shopping," and (4) "a perceived unfairness when different bodies of law are
applied to different parties in the same case."33 We will consider each of
these justifications separately and demonstrate that they are completely
spurious.
A. "Choice of Law Litigation of Staggering Complexity"
The authors simply state that the "law of a single designated jurisdic-
tion" rule is necessary to avoid "choice of law litigation of staggering com-
plexity."34 But there is no further explanation of what this means.
Presumably it refers both to the purported difficulty of deciding any choice
of law issue and to the purported number of choice of law issues that will
arise in a mass tort case. Neither concern is supportable. In practice,
32. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 557.
33. Id. (quoting Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the




choice of law issues in tort cases are not at all difficult to resolve. Choice of
law issues in tort cases tend to fall into certain fact-law patterns, and courts
that have abandoned the traditional "place of the wrong" rule tend to reach
predictable results in these cases.35 These results depend primarily on a
consideration of the policies reflected in the laws of the involved states and
the interest of each state in applying its law in order to implement that
policy.36 In practice, then, conflicts tort cases are not at all complex.
Likewise, the number of choice of law issues that will arise in any mass
tort case is limited, and most of these issues can be resolved prior to trial.
Even when a case is connected with more than one state or with a number
of states, the laws of the involved states will not differ on most of the issues
in the case. Where there is a difference, it can be pinpointed. Consider
again the California-Michigan-New York airplane crash. Since Michigan
and New York have the same negligence rule for design defect claims, no
conflict of laws is presented with respect to the claims of the survivors of
the Michigan residents against the New York manufacturer. A conflict of
laws is presented with respect to the claims of the survivors of the Califor-
nia residents against the New York manufacturer, which the California
courts would resolve in favor of the application of California law. Under
consolidation, there could be common discovery and pre-trial proceedings
for both sets of claims, but trial before different juries on the claims of the
California survivors and the claims of the New York survivors. This loss of
efficiency seems a small price to pay for adherence to the principle of uni-
formity of result in diversity cases and respect for implementation of the
important interests of California. And even when the plaintiffs come from a
large number of states and there is more than one defendant the case can be
broken down into subgroups of parties, much in the manner of subclasses in
a class action,37 and the conflict of laws issues resolved with respect to each
subgroup of parties.3"
35. See generally Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 979-83 (1977).
36. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis
and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 227-33 (1977).
37. FED. P. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
38. The subgroups would typically consist of the following: (1) plaintiffs from states with a
plaintiff-favoring rule; (2) plaintiffs from states with a defendant-favoring rule; (3) defendants
from states with a defendant-favoring rule; and (4) defendants from states with a plaintiff-favoring
rule. There would be no conflict of law issues in the cases involving plaintiffs from states with a
plaintiff-favoring rule and defendants from states with a plaintiff-favoring rule, or in the cases




We have demonstrated, therefore, that even with consolidation it is not
necessary to have all of the cases determined under the substantive law of a
"single designated jurisdiction" in order to avoid "choice of law litigation of
staggering complexity." The cases can be grouped into fact-law patterns,
and by following the approach as it is followed with respect to transfer of
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court would apply to each fact-law
pattern the relevant choice of law rules of each of the states from which the
case has been transferred. This will result in a limited number of party
groupings for trial. All that is then required is the empaneling of separate
juries, which can hear the evidence in common and decide the case under
separate instructions. While this approach imposes greater efficiency costs
than a "law of a single designated jurisdiction" rule, it implements very
important federalism policies and to us seems worth the cost.
B. "Delay in Settlements" and "Forum Shopping"
Likewise, once the choice of law decisions are made there will be no
"delay in settlements resulting from uncertainty in the choice of law to be
applied."3 9 The substantive law applicable to the resolution of each plain-
tiff's claim against each defendant will be known and to that extent will
facilitate settlement.
Regarding so-called "forum shopping," as we have pointed out above,
the "law of a single designated jurisdiction" rule encourages forum shop-
ping by defendants: the defendant can remove the case from a state where
the choice of law result is plaintiff-favoring in hopes of getting a different
choice of law result under the "law of a single designated jurisdiction" rule
that must be followed by the federal court to which the case has been re-
moved. As the Supreme Court has recently noted: "An opportunity for
forum shopping exists whenever a party has a choice of forums that will
apply different law."'  In this sense, the plaintiff in a mass tort case has
engaged in forum shopping when making the initial decision where to bring
the suit. All the law of a single designated jurisdiction rule does is to com-
pound forum shopping by giving the defendant a chance to forum shop
also. Consequently, to justify the "law of a single designated jurisdiction"
rule in terms of "avoiding an impetus toward forum shopping" is patent
nonsense; the rule will have exactly the opposite effect.
39. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 557.
40. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1282 (1990).
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C. "Perceived Unfairness" Horizontal Versus Vertical Inequality
Finally, we come to the matter of "perceived unfairness when different
bodies of law are applied to different parties in the same case."41 Here the
authors state that "the 'unfairness' associated with depriving a party of the
protection of state laws to which it might otherwise be entitled must be
balanced against the unfairness associated with applying different sources of
law to identically situated accident victims."'42 They raise the following
specter:
Two passengers sitting side by side in the same airplane are killed in
the same crash, and their families file identical wrongful death suits
against the airline in different courts. Under current law, it is possi-
ble that the airline could be found negligent in one suit, but not the
other, entitling the family of one victim to receive complete compen-
sation for its loss, while the family of the other victim receives a bill
for court costs. 43
They argue that a single choice of law rule would promote equality of re-
sult.' What they fail to perceive is that they have bartered vertical equality
for horizontal equality - and they have made a very bad trade.
Consider the plane crash described above and imagine one hundred
plaintiffs from California and fifty plaintiffs from Illinois, all killed when the
plane crashes on take-off in Illinois. Assume that California law applies to
allow recovery for California plaintiffs, but that Illinois law would deny
recovery for the Illinois plaintiffs under less favorable Illinois law. If asked
to explain the result to the Illinois plaintiff, we could point to the fact that
the state which has the most significant interest with their well-being has
denied recovery in such cases. They are, in fact, treated as Illinois treats its
residents in a domestic injury case. The horizontal inequality is present, but
it is explainable. Reasonable people can understand that different legal sys-
tems provide different rights to their respective residents.
Now let us look at the same case under H.R. 3406. If the "law of a
designated single jurisdiction" rule is to apply, either all parties will be al-
lowed recovery or denied recovery. Assume that the court chooses the
choice of law rule that denies recovery. Now the disappointed California
plaintiffs ask, "Why did we lose?" The answer has to be "Because you were
involved in an accident that involved more than twenty-five people. We
sacrificed you to efficiency." We submit that the answer has no explanatory
41. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 557.
42. Id. at 565-66.
43. Id. at 551.
44. Id. at 552.
1990]
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power whatsoever. It would be quite different if the source of law chosen to
govern mass torts were federal substantive tort law especially tailored to
deal with mass tort litigation. The answer would be that the law that gov-
erns his or her litigation was designed to respond to the unique problems of
mass torts. But H.R. 3406 does not create such a body of federal law. Par-
ties are relegated to state tort law. The decision as to which body of law
will govern will be determined by the number of victims in the tragedy.
When more than twenty-five victims are involved, one body of law governs;
when less than twenty-five are involved, another body of law governs.
Thus, we strongly disagree with Kastemeier and Geyh. They have given
up consistency for a single transaction and have bartered both substantive
fairness to the parties and inequality between similarly situated parties but
for the fact that one was injured in an accident that had more people in-
volved in it.
Ultimately, the inherent fallacy in the Kastenmeier and Geyh position is
the assumption that accident victims are "similarly situated," simply be-
cause they have been involved in the same accident. Neither the authors nor
the Department of Justice explain what makes victims of the same accident
similarly situated. The question that immediately comes to mind: "With
respect to what are they similarly situated?" They are similarly situated
only in the sense that they have been involved in the same accident. But
they are not similarly situated with respect to the policies embodied in the
laws of the involved states nor the interests of the involved states in having
their laws applied in order to implement the policy reflected in those laws.
IV. THE PRACTICAL FALLOUT
Finally, we urge Kastenmeier and Geyh to take a realistic look at litiga-
tion the way it would look the day after H.R. 3406 would become law.
What law would litigants expect to govern their cases? It has taken twenty-
five years of turmoil since the onset of the choice of law revolution to bring
some predictability and stability to the field. In any given state, if one ex-
amines the choice of law cases, one can predict with fair accuracy what law
that state would apply to a choice of law issue presented in a particular
case.45 Under H.R. 3406 that process would have to begin anew. Each
45. There is now a well-developed body of case law in every jurisdiction that indicates which
particular brand of interest analysis the state follows and how the theory plays out in practice.
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of
Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985); Neumeier v. Kuelner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d
494 (1973). Though there is substantial controversy among different states on how to resolve
choice-of-law problems, within a given state results are highly'predictable. For a thorough and
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federal court of appeals would have to decide for itself which "brand of
interest analysis" it would follow and how it would balance various inter-
ests.' Another quarter century of chaos awaits us. Any expectation that
the United States Supreme Court would step in and provide guidance is
likely to be unrealistic.4 7 And one almost shudders to think of what the
results would be if the Supreme Court did get involved.4" By almost all
accounts, the work product of the Court in the areas of choice of law and
jurisdiction has been quixotic. In short, for the foreseeable future mass tort
cases will not be resolvable quickly through litigation or settlement because
we will have to wait for the courts to create this new body of "federal choice
of law principles."
enlightening discussion of the various choice-of-law approaches adopted by the various states, see
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.16 - .32 (3d ed. 1986).
46. Not only would a federal court face the difficult task of deciding which of the various
choice-of-law methodologies it would have to adopt, it would face the problem of choice in a most
difficult setting. A federal court sitting in a diversity case with total freedom to choose law as it
sees fit is a disinterested state. In normal interstate conflict cases when a state decides that a true
conflict between the parties of two interested jurisdictions exists, the forum will usually opt to
apply its own law. See Sedler, supra note 35. It is a rare conflicts case in which the forum is a
disinterested state. There is little guidance in state choice-of-law methodology on how to treat the
true conflict case in this setting. Thus, a federal court seeking to find its way would have to face
the "true conflict" case in a setting for which there is little guidance from state decisional law.
For an early exploration of this problem, see CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PRocEss 216-24
(1965).
47. If the Court's decisions in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and Sun Oil
Co. v Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), are any barometer, the Court appears unwilling to strike
down even highly imprudent, if not outrageous, state choice-of-law decisions. Perhaps, given the
mandate to create federal choice-of-law principles, the Court might attempt to work out conflicts
between differing views of the various circuit courts. It is likely, however, that there will be a long
period of gestation before the Court would be prepared to act decisively.
48. The work of the Court in the area of in personan jurisdiction has left even the most
knowledgeable observers befuddled. See, eg., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For critical commentary, see, eg., Cox, The
Interrelationship of Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Forging New Theory Through Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 189 (1987); Dessen, Personal Jurisdic-
tion after Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. (1987); Seidelson, A
Supreme Court Conclusion and The Rationales That Defy Comprehension: Asahi Metal Industries
Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 563 (1987); Stewart, A New Litany of
Personal Jurisdiction, 60 COLO. L. REv. 5 (1989); Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction
Down the Tubes, 23 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 55 (1988); and Symposium, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court and The Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 39 S.C.L. REV. 815 (1988).
The Court continues to be fascinated by the subject of jurisdiction and now appears poised to
do even further damage to well-settled doctrine. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-1647).
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V. CONCLUSION
We remain convinced that H.R. 3406 is not a good bill. It sacrifices
state interests, fosters unexplainable inequality, and creates an atmosphere
of unpredictability that will cause a significant increase in litigation because
no one will know what the "new choice of law rules" are. And all this for
what? As Kastenmeier and Geyh admit, the true "gorilla problems"'49 fos-
tered by the mega-cases (e.g., Agent Orange, asbestos, Dalkon Shield) will
not be resolved by enacting the pending bill. What they call the "spider
monkey" problems, 50 i.e., the run of the mill mass tort problems, are simply
not of such significance to warrant the enactment of legislation which
brings about all the ills we have identified. The burden of proof for change
rests on the proponents. In our opinion, they have failed by a wide mark to
make their case.
49. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 4, at 548.
50. Id.
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